the present federal system of protection, while encouraging innovation and thoughtful regulation, leads to consumer confusion.
allocation system, examines the current system, and measures the current system against the ideals.
The ideal system
If one could design an ideal system of allocating fraud liability among various parties to a fraudulent card transaction, what kinds of behaviors would the system seek to encourage? First, and perhaps most important, the system would encourage the widespread use of payment cards by consumers. In general, consumers are risk adverse and will disproportionately underuse a payment product they believe is risky. For this reason, an ideal fraud allocation system would convince consumers that any checking account balances or lines of credit associated with a payment card are safe and easily replaceable in the event of theft. Without trust in the system's ability to indemnify victims of random acts of fraud or theft, consumers would be hesitant to use it.
Second, the rules of allocating liability in the ideal system would encourage parties to the transaction to exercise due care. System participants, such as consumers, issuers, and merchants, would work to minimize fraudulent activities over which they have some measure of control.
Consumers, for example, would take special care to safeguard their cards and monitor their accounts for suspicious activity; issuers would create secure cards and card processing systems that would be difficult to compromise; and merchants would properly use card processing systems and take measures to verify that the cards presented to them actually belong to those doing the presenting. In short, each party would take some simple and relatively cost effective steps that, together, would reduce the system's exposure to most types of fraud.
Finally, in an ideal environment, payment system participants would adopt any fraudreduction strategy that saved the entire system more money than it cost, even if the benefits of such a strategy accrued disproportionately to the parties involved. 5 Consider, for example, a hypothetical fraud strategy that could halve the total fraud occurring in the system at a cost equal to 10 percent of total fraud. In an ideal payment system, the strategy would be adopted, even if no single participant experienced enough savings to entirely pay for the strategy's implementation on its own. 6 2. The current system I now examine the current fraud allocation system and its incentives. For the purpose of this analysis, four parties are considered: consumers, traditional brick-and-mortar merchants,
Internet and catalogue merchants, and card issuers. The payment card networks that make the rules with respect to fraud allocation are also critical entities. But since the major networks in the U.S., i.e., MasterCard, Visa, American Express, and Discover, are controlled by those who issue cards, 7 I will assume that issuer interests and network interests are aligned. 8 Another important entity in a card payment transaction is the merchant's bank. In general, however, any fraud expense incurred by a merchant bank on behalf of a merchant is immediately passed along to the merchant. Appendix B includes a diagram of a typical card transaction, including the parties discussed above. 5 As used here, the term "cost" includes more than just fraud losses and the expense of anti-fraud technologies and systems. It also includes the time it takes users of a proposed fraud-reduction scheme to meet its requirements and the cost of any legitimate sales lost because of fraud screening. 6 The type of efficiency described here, in which an improvement to a system will be made as long as its benefits outweigh its costs, is typically referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. It is different from so-called Pareto efficiency in which a change to the system is made only if it makes some better off and no one worse off. 7 In August 2005, MasterCard announced that it will overhaul its corporate governance and ownership structure. As part of this overhaul, it plans to become a publicly traded company and shift control of the entity from its existing bank shareholders to investors. It is unclear how this change will affect the relationship between MasterCard and the banks that have traditionally controlled it. See MasterCard press release, "MasterCard Announces Plans for New Governance and Ownership," Aug. 31, 2005, available at www.mastercardinternational.com/cgi-bin/newsroom.cgi?id=1081&category=all. 8 In the case of American Express and Discover, the issuing bank and network are operated by the same company. As a result, network and issuer interests in their cases are perfectly aligned. 3. The ideal system vs. the current system
As described earlier, an ideal system of fraud allocation would accomplish three goals: It would encourage consumer usage of card products, provide parties with incentives to exercise due care, and adopt any fraud-reduction schemes that provide a net benefit to the system as a whole. I argue that the current fraud allocation scheme accomplishes the first of these three goals and falls short with respect to the last two.
By fully insulating most consumers from the liability associated with fraudulent transactions, the current system promotes consumer confidence and, as a result, encourages the 16 In total, credit and debit card purchases now account for almost half of all noncash payments. 17 Overall, the consumer-friendly fraud allocation system adopted by the payment networks approaches the hypothetical ideal in that it has contributed to the widespread adoption of credit and debit cards by consumers.
While the current system achieves nearly ideal levels of consumer adoption, it does so at the expense of another ideal-that of encouraging parties to exercise care. This is the case because the system resolves two competing interests-encouraging consumers to use the payment networks and requiring that they bear the costs of their behaviors-in favor of the consumer. For example, even a consumer who writes his personal identification number (PIN) on the front of his 15 Thomas A. Durkin, "Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970 -2000 ," Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 2000 Christoslav E. Anguelov et al., "U.S. Consumers and Electronic Banking, 1995 -2003 ," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Winter 2004 , p.6. 17 Federal Reserve System, "Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2003 ," December 2004 card with permanent pen is not responsible for subsequent PIN-debit losses as long as he reports the theft of his card or discovers the fraud within relatively generous time frames. 18 These proconsumer fraud policies make it difficult for card issuers and merchants to encourage consumers to take the relatively simple steps within their control to reduce the system's exposure to fraud.
Another example of this is the difficulty Visa is experiencing in enrolling consumers in Verified by Visa (VbV), an Internet payment authentication scheme. While Visa has significantly increased the number of merchants that accept VbV through price incentives, it has not yet enrolled even 1 percent of its U.S. consumer card base. 19 Given consumers' incentives (i.e., zero liability for Internet fraud losses), one would not expect consumers to adopt VbV without a change to the current system.
The incentives built into the current system also fail to encourage brick-and-mortar merchants to exercise reasonable care in order to avoid fraud. In theory, merchants must go through a variety of steps (e.g., examining card security features, verifying signatures) when accepting a credit or debit card in order to avoid any liability for fraud. In practice, however, merchants are challenged to be as exacting as the rules require and often do not attempt to verify signatures or ask for identification when the signature panel is illegible. Fraud losses that result because of a failure to verify a signature are typically covered by issuers because it is difficult for issuers to prove that a merchant did not follow the proper procedures. 20 Because brick-and-mortar merchants are generally not responsible for this fraud, they have little incentive to carefully examine signatures and ask for identification when necessary. In an ideal system, however, merchants would be encouraged to use the simple tools available to them, i.e., the ability to simultaneously observe the card and the signing of the receipt, to avoid losses. /Feb. 2005, p. 34. 20 This is the case because a card used to perpetrate fraud is rarely recovered, and, as a result, it is often impossible to verify that the signature on the back of the card differs from the signature on a receipt. In many cases, a thief or counterfeiter will actually sign or re-sign the back of the card with his own hand, rendering verification by the merchant ineffective.
The current fraud allocation system is also less than ideal in that it has not encouraged the adoption of more efficient tools to fight Internet fraud. Ideally, a fraud allocation system would encourage merchants, issuers, and consumers to adopt any fraud management strategy that would represent a net benefit to the system. Because the present fraud allocation rules place all liability for Internet fraud on Internet merchants, however, there is little incentive for consumers or issuers to adopt systemwide tools that prevent Internet-based fraud. As a result, the thousands of merchants that do business on the Internet have had to independently shop for and deploy would be of little benefit to issuers and costly. Ideally, however, Internet merchants could compensate issuers for this expense and the common solution would be adopted.
It is clear that the current rules for allocating fraud liability among the various parties to a card transaction have contributed to a very high level of consumer adoption of credit and debit cards. It is also clear that, because of strong economic incentives, issuers have done an excellent job combating the brick-and-mortar-merchant fraud for which issuers themselves are liable. The incentive structure has so far failed, however, to encourage system participants to adopt fraud prevention tools for Internet purchases that are as effective or efficient as those used in the brickand-mortar environment.
B. Increasing the Costs of Consumer Goods and Services
In addition to influencing the adoption of fraud reduction schemes, the systems of protection described in the two earlier papers in this series significantly increase the cost of electronic payments. As described in the first two papers, depending on card type and issuer, a payment card transaction may be protected by a variety of federal laws and voluntary policies. All market participants may not appreciate, however, the expense of these protections and how these protections likely increase the cost of the goods and services that are consumed.
In general, the expense associated with providing fraud, error, and dispute protection has two components: a direct cost component and a processing cost component. In the context of a fraudulent transaction, the direct cost component is the value of the good or service that is stolen by the perpetrator of the fraud. As described in the previous section, direct fraud losses from debit and credit card use totals approximately $3 billion per year. In the case of dispute, the direct cost is the value of any goods or services for which the consumer will not be liable (but for which the issuer or merchant will take responsibility). It is difficult to estimate the extent of such direct losses, as issuers may voluntarily accept them or merchants may go on to recover some of these direct losses from the consumer (either by having the consumer return the merchandise or initiating collection proceedings). 21 Information regarding the outcome of merchants' recovery and collections efforts is not available. In the case of error, there typically is no direct loss because the consumer reporting it has paid more for the goods and services then they should have.
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The second component is the cost of processing a fraudulent, erroneous, or disputed transaction. When a consumer discovers a fraudulent transaction or wants to initiate a dispute, she notifies her card's issuer. Depending on the circumstances, the issuer may either initiate a "receipt retrieval request" (to get more information about the charge) or reverse, i.e., "charge back," the transaction to the merchant that originated it. In the first instance, the merchant must send a copy of the signed transaction receipt to the issuer. In the second instance, the issuer refuses to pay for 21 While a consumer who convinces his card's issuer to charge back a disputed transaction is no longer responsible for the charge to the issuer, he may still be responsible for the charge to the merchant. As such, the merchant may pursue the consumer under state sales law for the value of any goods or services from which the consumer benefited. See Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)-2 (2005). 22 Errors that merchants and issuers make in favor of consumers are not likely to result in consumer harm and, as a result, are not addressed by consumer protection policies.
the transaction and "charges it back" to the merchant. The merchant, in turn, may refuse to accept the chargeback (a decision usually supported by some kind of evidence). The issuer may once again attempt to charge the transaction back, and, if the merchant again refuses to accept the chargeback, the merchant and issuer submit their claim to arbitration.
Processing retrieval requests and chargebacks that are prompted by consumers' calls is resource intensive and represents a significant cost to the industry. Large issuers, for example, build computer systems and staff entire departments that specialize in handling consumers' calls regarding fraudulent and disputed transactions. The merchant processors on the receiving side of such requests similarly invest in personnel and system resources to handle issuers' inquiries.
Beyond systems and staffing costs, issuers and merchants face fees when they use the associations' networks for chargebacks. Issuers who initiate a chargeback, for example, must pay a fee to the association that ranges from $10 to $25, and a similar fee is assessed to the merchant to whom the transaction is returned. If the chargeback is disputed and goes to arbitration, a fee of over $400 is typically assessed to the losing party. To retrieve a receipt, merchants often pay a fee to their merchant processor of up to $8.
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Because of a lack of data, it is difficult to estimate the total cost of protecting consumers from fraud, error, and dispute. As mentioned earlier, issuers and merchants incur approximately $3 billion in direct credit and debit card fraud losses each year. Credit card issuers spend approximately $1 billion to $2 billion to process disputed, erroneous, and fraudulent charges.
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Estimates as to how much debit card issuers and merchants (or merchant processors) spend on processing problem transactions are not available. There are also no estimates for how much merchants lose to chargebacks resulting from error or dispute. Based only on the portion of expenses for which there are estimates (i.e., credit and debit card fraud losses and credit card dispute processing costs), the system spends at least $12 to $18 per active card per year to protect 23 Mark Betz, "Chargebacks and Consumer Behavior," Transaction World Magazine, Oct. 2001, p.9. 24 See Betz.
consumers. 25 As a percentage of volume that moves through the system, these known costs represent 25 to 30 basis points.
The $4 billion to $5 billion in total known expenses that result from the extension of fraud, error, and dispute protections are not paid for by any single party to credit or debit card transactions. Instead, the costs of these protections are ultimately passed along to consumers in the form of higher interest rates or fees on payment products or higher prices for retailers' goods and services.
One could argue that competition led to the creation of the bulk of these relatively expensive protections, since the extent to which consumers are protected by the bankcard associations often exceeds federal requirements. It is clear, however, that federal law significantly influenced the shape of the current protection system. Consider, for example, the most significant disparity between signature debit cards and PIN debit cards-the ability of a consumer to dispute a charge and request that his or her issuer charge it back to the merchant. efforts to protect consumers affect consumers' expectations and the products beyond those the government sets out to regulate.
The fraud, error, and dispute protections extended to consumers of credit and debit cards generate expenses for the payment system that are high, relatively diffuse, and largely attributable to federal regulation. It is not clear, however, whether the beneficiaries of these protections, i.e., consumers, fully appreciate these expenses and how they increase the costs of goods and services.
It is also not clear whether policymakers, who mandated protections on credit cards and not debit cards, appreciate how their policies have shaped the broad payment card market. Without such an appreciation, payment system participants cannot accurately evaluate the utility of various consumer protection policies.
C. Leading to Consumer Confusion
In the U.S., where new payment products are constantly competing for space in consumers' wallets, one can envision at least two ways of implementing federal consumer protections (assuming that such protection is needed). The first is by promulgating rules and regulations that address specific problems associated with a specific payment vehicle after observing how consumers use that vehicle. The second is by promulgating rules and regulations that are generic and applicable to all forms of electronic payments, including emerging payment forms that are being introduced to consumers for the first time. Both of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages that policymakers must consider.
The advantages of the wait-and-see approach are many: First, it allows payment innovators to introduce products that may not otherwise be viable if immediately subjected to costly regulation. In the period preceding regulation, innovators can test how consumers respond to different protection regimes and modify their product and its protections based on these responses. Second, this approach gives policymakers a chance to observe how a new product has been used and marketed before the writing of regulations. This permits policymakers to tailor protections to the actual problems that users of the new payment form are most likely to experience. In addition, this approach lets policymakers observe the successes and failures associated with different protection regimes, improving the likelihood of policymakers choosing a scheme in line with consumers' needs.
The wait-and-see approach, however, is not without disadvantages. During the wait-andsee period, early adopters of a new payment form may be essentially unprotected, vulnerable to problems such as fraud, error, and dispute. Also during this period, issuers are uncertain as to how their product is going to be regulated. This uncertainty creates incentives for innovators to spend less money developing new payment forms and to spend more time trying to influence how regulators write consumer protection rules. Finally, the wait-and-see approach leads to inconsistent regulation. The rules that apply to each payment product differ based on how most consumers use the product and how the product is marketed-attributes that are probably not apparent to most consumers.
The key advantage of the one-rule-for-all approach is its simplicity for all parties involved in a transaction. Under this approach, issuers understand that any product introduced must carry a minimal level of protection; there is no uncertainty surrounding how the product will be regulated in the future. Consumers understand that, regardless of how a payment product is marketed, how long it has been around, or how other consumers primarily use it, it is protected in the same way as the other products they use. And merchants understand that, when they accept a new form of payment, the range of problems for which consumers will have recourse are generally predictable. 28 "The Board believes it is important that the coverage issue be resolved at this time because the number of debit cards being used in POS transactions is increasing…By the end of 1983, the number of debit cards was expected to exceed 6 million." 49 Fed. Reg. 2204 Reg. (1984 . 29 See 59 Fed. Reg. 10,678 (1994) . 30 See 59 Fed. Reg. 31 In September 2004, the Board published for comment a proposal to amend Regulation E so that it covers payroll cards. See 69 Fed. Reg. 55,996 (2004) . 32 Ann All, (Apr. 7, 2004 ) "The Channel Shuffle," ATMmarketplace.com, available at www.atmmarketplace.com/futurearticles.htm?article_id=18820&pavilion=112&step=storywww.ATMmark etplace.com (accessed Sept. 29, 2005) . 33 In May 1996, the Board proposed a rule that would have exempted many stored-value products from Regulation E and subjected other products to limited regulatory requirements. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696 (1996) . It seems clear that U.S. policymakers favor the wait-and-see approach. They wait until a product is somewhat popular before regulating, and they regulate in a way that takes account of the payment form's unique characteristics. As compared to the one-rule-for-all approach, the current model likely produces regulations that are more responsive to consumers, less intrusive to industry, and more fostering of innovation. Unfortunately, however, it also causes greater confusion, particularly among consumers who use multiple payment products.
Responses to the wait-and-see policy have been mixed. The few legal scholars who have examined this issue advocate more uniformity among the payment laws that apply to credit cards, debit cards, and other electronic forms of payment. 34 In the context of general government regulation, economists argue that the wait-and-see approach is better because it permits market forces to influence the regulatory outcome. As seen in this series of papers, issuers have responded to the wait-and-see approach by attempting to impose uniformity through the use of voluntary protections. The additional layer of protection issuers provide, however, comes with its own list of exceptions, exclusions, and reporting rules that may add to consumer confusion.
The present system of federal consumer protection values customized and responsive regulation over consistency, predictability, and ease of understanding. While this may be a wise choice, there are likely ways of making the present federal system less opaque for consumers.
Overall, policymakers would be wise to consider reforms to our federal consumer protection scheme that make it more transparent without causing it to lose its flexibility. 
III. Conclusion
Without a doubt, the protection systems described in the first two papers in this series are of tremendous benefit to all of those involved in the payment system. They encourage the adoption of electronic payment products, function as a type of insurance that spreads the risk of unforeseeable losses, induce consumers to make purchases from merchants whom consumers may not otherwise trust, and encourage payment system innovation. Overall, fraud, error, and dispute protections give consumers confidence in the electronic payment systems on which they often must rely.
These protections and the systems that support them, however, are not without costs. The present system used to allocate responsibility for fraudulent transactions results in (1) consumers and brick-and-mortar merchants not having sufficient incentives to exercise a reasonable level of care during card transactions and (2) Internet merchants inefficiently addressing the problem of Internet fraud on an ad hoc and individual basis. In addition, the direct cost of covering fraud, error, and dispute losses, combined with the cost associated with processing and adjudicating consumers' claims, has a material effect on the prices of the payment products and goods and services consumers use. Finally, the federal government's system for protecting consumers, because of the value it places on customization and flexibility, causes consumers of electronic payment products to be confused about how they are protected. Payment system stakeholders should have an interest in further exploring these issues, since their resolution could increase efficiency, lower costs, enhance competition, and open the consumer payment market to more desirable products. Zero liability policies require issuers to shield consumers from any liability for fraudulent use. Policies, however, are subject to various association-and bankimposed limitations.
Many issuers will honor the associations' zero liability policies for 90 days or more. A minority will assess the $50 permitted by Regulation Z after 60 or fewer days.
ERROR:
Requires card issuers to investigate and resolve a consumer's claim that a transaction is in error. Consumers must notify issuers of the suspected error within 60 days of receiving the statement on which the alleged error appears.
State statutes generally do not address this specific situation.
"Chargeback" policies permit issuers to assist consumers who discover erroneous transactions for up to 120 days after the date of the transaction.
Issuers will generally leverage the "chargeback" procedures of the associations and assist consumers who discover an error for as long as they are permitted (i.e., 120 days).
DISPUTE:
Permits consumer to assert that a charge for goods that were never delivered was an "error," triggering error resolution procedures described above.
Permits consumer to assert merchant-related claims against the card issuer as long as the consumer (i) has not yet paid for charge, (ii) made a good faith attempt to settle dispute, (iii) lives in same state as or within 100 miles of the merchant, and (iii) paid more than $50 for the item.
In some states, a creditor in a consumer loan transaction is subject to all of the defenses of the borrower arising from the consumer sale for which the proceeds of the loan were used.
"Chargeback" policies permit issuers to return a transaction if a dispute arises up to 120 days after the date of transaction. While ultimately done at the issuer's discretion, dispute-related chargebacks may not be subject to the same distance or amount limitations as the Regulation Z "claims and defenses" protection. Zero liability policies require issuers to shield consumers from any liability for fraudulent use. Policies, however, are subject to various association-and bankimposed limitations (e.g., consumers must exercise "reasonable care" in handling card).
Varies by issuer. Some issuers explicitly limit period after loss or theft of card during which they will provide zero liability. These issuers will not provisionally credit for 10 days. Others provide zero liability for 60 days and provisionally credit promptly.
ERROR:
Federal statutes generally do not address this specific issue.
State statutes generally do not address this specific issue.
Most issuers explicitly provide strong error-resolution protection for at least 60 days. Many will generally leverage the "chargeback" procedures of the associations and assist consumers who discover an error for as long as they are permitted (i.e., 120 days). State statutes generally do not address this specific issue.
"Chargeback" policies permit issuers to return a transaction if a dispute arises up to 120 days after the date of transaction. Disputerelated chargebacks, however, are ultimately done at the issuer's discretion.
Varies by issuer. Some leverage the associations' chargeback procedures to assist a consumer who is in a dispute with a merchant as long as the consumer provides sufficient proof of her claim. Others require consumers to settle disputes themselves.
*Please note: These protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them unilaterally or decide not to abide by them. ** Information intended only to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank's policies for further information.
